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ABSTRACT 
 
This research explores whether shareholder protection influences analyst optimism and forecast 
accuracy in a global setting. The first set of empirical results suggests that, as commonly observed in 
the existing domestic literature, analyst optimism characterizes analysts’ forecasts in the 19 sample 
countries. Further empirical results provide evidence that analyst forecasts issued in countries with 
strong shareholder protection laws are less optimistic and more accurate than analyst forecasts 
published in countries with weak protection laws. It is also observed that analyst forecast is superior 
to a naïve model of no change in earnings. (JEL: G15, G18) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
any studies have examined analysts’ earnings forecasts. Some conclude that analysts’ forecasts tend 
to exceed actual earnings performance (Butler and Lang, 1991; Abarbanell, 1991; Ackert and 
Athanassakos, 1997), while others explore more complex hypotheses about how analysts respond to 
new earnings information. Among the latter are La Porta (1996) and Easterwood and Nutt (1999), who establish a 
connection between analyst optimism and under- and overreaction to new earnings information. On the other hand, 
Keane and Runkle (1998) argue that analysts make rational forecasts. They challenge some of the earlier findings, 
concluding that they suffer from methodological flaws that result in findings of “irrationality” – e.g., analyst optimism.  
 
The extant analysis of analysts showing systematic behavioral tendency overlooks an important institutional 
factor: shareholder protection, which is measured by the shareholder rights such as one share-one vote, proxy by mail, 
and preemptive rights to new issues. Recently, Hung (2001) and Hope (2003) report that shareholder protection 
reduces earnings manipulation and uncertainty in earnings forecasts. Reductions in earnings manipulation and forecast 
uncertainty are, in turn, likely to reduce analyst optimism and improve forecast accuracy. This paper extends prior 
studies by investigating the relationships between analyst optimism and shareholder protection and between forecast 
accuracy and shareholder protection in a global setting. I assess the country-specific levels of legal shareholder 
protection for 19 foreign countries and directly relate them to two bias variables (optimism and accuracy) that are 
affected by the forecasting behavior of analysts. Understanding the relationships of shareholder protection with 
analyst optimism and accuracy provides insights into the impact of regulatory policies on earnings forecasts and 
eventually on security valuation.  
 
As in other studies, I draw on the classification scheme of La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1998) and classify the sample countries into two groups based on the degree of legal shareholder protection (Hung, 
2001; Hope, 2003). Based on this classification, I test the hypothesis that analysts in the strong shareholder-protective 
countries issue less biased – i.e., more accurate and less optimistic – earnings forecasts than those in the weak 
shareholder-protective. The empirical findings are supportive of this hypothesis. In addition, I examine the relative 
performance of analysts’ forecasts against a naïve forecasting model and find that analyst forecast is superior.  
 
 
Table 1:  Portfolio Formation Based On Shareholder Protection 
 
The portfolio “strong” stands for strong shareholder protection, while the portfolio “weak” denotes weak shareholder protection. 
Shareholder Protection Portfolio Countries 
Strong 
Canada, Hong Kong, India, Malaysia, Singapore, South 
Africa, United Kingdom, Japan, Chile 
Weak 
Belgium, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Mexico, Netherlands, 
Turkey, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark 
M 
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This paper contributes to the existing literature on analyst forecasting behavior in three ways. First, it 
presents evidence that investor protection is an important factor influencing analyst forecast bias and extends the 
previous studies that simply focus on prevalent analyst bias in earnings forecasts. Second, by using the individual 
earnings forecasts compiled from the I/B/E/S database, I generate a set of aggregate earnings forecasts and estimate 
the median forecast for actual earnings of a firm as opposed to using the I/B/E/S consensus earnings forecasts. This 
process reduces potential bias due to the publication lag from using the consensus forecasts (O’Brien, 1988). Third, to 
mitigate the problem of misspecification, I control for analyst coverage, bias persistence, country, time, and industry 
effects, and forecast dispersion. 
 
PRIOR STUDIES 
 
An extensive body of prior literature suggests that optimism is a typical characteristic of the U.S. analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. For the period from 1981 to 1984, Abarbanell (1991) documents that the average consensus 
forecast is optimistic, and that the number of optimistic forecasts surpasses that of pessimistic forecasts. Analyzing the 
characteristics of individual analysts’ earnings forecasts, Butler and Lang (1991) find that individual analysts are 
persistently optimistic in relation to median consensus forecasts. La Porta (1996) shows that analysts tend to issue 
upward-bias earnings forecasts for growth stocks. Kwag and Shrieves (2005) further find that, although analyst 
optimism seems to be a characteristic of earnings forecasts, both persistent optimism and pessimism can be 
successfully formed on the basis of the historical information on consensus forecast errors. Ang and Ma (1999) add 
international evidence of analyst optimism. They document that the aggregate analyst optimism of Chinese shares is 
about twice that of Hong Kong companies' shares. With respect to analyst optimism, they compare Chinese shares 
with those of other Pacific Basin countries such as Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, 
Philippines, and the U.S., and show that the analyst optimism of Chinese shares is much higher than that of any other 
Pacific Basin country. In sum, analysts, as a group of market participants, appear to issue optimistic forecasts and the 
level of optimism seems to differ across countries. 
 
Two recent studies investigate the associations between shareholder protection and earnings manipulation, 
and between shareholder protection and analyst forecast accuracy (Hung, 2001; Hope, 2003). Hung (2001) finds 
evidence that earnings manipulation weakens in strong shareholder protection environments. He indirectly tests the 
hypothesis that strong shareholder protection discourages managers from manipulating earnings and thus will 
eventually increase the value relevance of analysts’ earnings forecasts. He finds that there is a significant association 
between shareholder protection and the value relevance of earnings. Investigating the effects of variations in 
enforcement of accounting standards on analyst forecast accuracy, Hope (2003) reports that strong enforcement of 
accounting standards, in part reflective of strong shareholder protection, reduces uncertainty in earnings forecasts and 
improves analyst forecast accuracy. The regressions of forecast accuracy on enforcement and various control variables 
show significantly positive parameter estimates of enforcement at the 1% level. 
 
In line with the Hope’s study, the current research investigates the forecasting behavior of international 
financial analysts in relation to shareholder protection. Different from the Hope’s study, it directly relates both analyst 
optimism and forecast accuracy to shareholder protection. This topic is important because financial analysts are one of 
the major forces to form the market expectations about security prices, yet the presence and levels of shareholder 
protection vary across countries. Thus, an interesting question emerges naturally: does shareholder protection 
moderate analyst optimism and enhance forecast accuracy?     
 
PORTFOLIO FORMATION AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Countries have various legal systems to protect shareholders. Some provide stronger protection of investors 
than others. La Porta et al. (1998) rank countries based on the existence of legal rules such as one share-one vote, 
proxy by mail, shares not blocked before a shareholders’ meeting, cumulative voting or proportional representation, 
oppressed minorities mechanism, and preemptive rights to new issues. Countries are considered shareholder-
protective if the company law or commercial code of the country (1) requires that ordinary shares carry one vote per 
share; (2) allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote to the firm; (3) does not prevent shareholders from selling 
shares for a number of days prior to a general shareholders’ meeting; (4) allows cumulative voting for directors or 
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proportional representation on the board that gives more power for minority shareholders to put their representatives 
on boards of directors; (5) grants minority shareholders the right to challenge the directors’ decisions in court; or (6) 
offers shareholders the preemptive right to buy new shares so that they are protected from dilution.  
 
Drawing on the classification scheme of La Porta et al., I construct two testable portfolios of countries – 
strong and weak. The portfolio “strong” stands for the strong shareholder protection, while the portfolio “weak” 
denotes the weak shareholder protection. If a shareholder protection rule exists in the country, I assign a binary 
numeric value to the country. A binary variable is equal to one if the country incorporates the corresponding legal rule 
to the company law or commercial code, and zero otherwise. Thus, if a country possessed all the rules effective in its 
jurisdiction, the score of shareholder protection would be six, indicating very strong shareholder protection. There is, 
however, no country with a shareholder-protection score of six. This means that every country in the sample misses at 
least one of the six rules. Note, however, that no one specific rule is systematically missing across countries. If a 
country does not have any of the six rules incorporated in its commercial code (i.e., it has a shareholder-protection 
score of zero), it is considered a country with very weak shareholder protection. As a result, the score of shareholder 
protection ranges 0 to 5. The countries with the shareholder-protection scores 4 and 5 are assigned to the strong 
portfolio, while countries with the scores 0 and 1 are assigned to the weak portfolio (see Table 1).  
 
Investors in the strong portfolio can actively participate in voting for new directors. Their shares are well 
represented in shareholders’ meetings even though they are minorities. It is easier for them to call an extraordinary 
shareholders’ meeting on special issues. In addition, managers in the strong portfolio are less prone to manage 
earnings and more inclined to distribute the firm’s true earnings information. Accordingly, analysts tracking firms in a 
strong shareholder-protected system are likely to issue less biased earnings forecasts than do those in a weak system.  
 
From these expectations, I derive two hypotheses: First, analysts issue more accurate earnings forecasts when 
shareholders are strongly protected by the law, since managers have fewer opportunities to manipulate earnings and 
shareholder protection reduces uncertainty in earnings forecasts. Second, analysts are less optimistic when they 
forecast earnings under the strong shareholder-protected law, probably because analysts have stronger incentives to 
affect security prices through monitoring and forecast improvements.   
 
Data 
 
The source of data is the I/B/E/S International database. Since it is well documented that consensus earnings 
forecasts in the I/B/E/S Summary tape contain “stale” forecasts which may bias the empirical tests, I use individual 
analysts’ forecasts compiled in the I/B/E/S Detail tape. Following O’Brien (1988), I create a set of aggregate earnings 
forecasts with a 90-day window. I start with the annual earnings announcement date and then retrieve individual 
forecasts that have a date prior to that. I use a "window" of 90 days of the announcement date to collect individual 
forecasts that will be used to estimate the median forecast for actual earnings of a firm. For example, if the actual 
earnings were announced on March 31, I would use an interval from January 1 to March 30 as the window within 
which I would collect individual forecasts. If there were two or more forecasts from the same analyst during the 90-
day period, I would only use the latest one. Then I calculate the median and standard deviation among all the 
individual analysts' forecasts that meet the dating criterion. 
 
The final sample consists of the median earnings forecasts of individual analysts and actual annual earnings 
for international firms covering 19 countries during the period 1989-2003. The sample size is 50,707 firm-years 
(11,279 international firms). Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) state that cross-listed firms are associated with greater 
analyst coverage and increased forecast accuracy. Thus, cross-listing is a potential confounding variable that may 
affect analyst optimism and forecast accuracy. Therefore, I identify firms listed on the U.S. exchanges – NYSE, 
AMEX, or NASDAQ – by obtaining this information from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
database. The sample contains 273 cross-listed firms (1,415 firm-years), representing 2.4% of the sample size.  
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Bias Measures 
 
As in Ang and Ma (1999), I employ three measures of analyst forecast bias: (1) the signed forecast error 
(FEi,t), scaled by the actual earnings; (2) the absolute forecast error (|FE|i,t), scaled by the actual earnings; and (3) the 
absolute forecast error, scaled by a change in actual earnings. The following describe the equations used to estimate 
the three different characteristics of analysts’ forecasts. 
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where Ait (Ai,t-1) is actual annual earnings in year t (t-1) for firm i, Fit is the median forecast of individual analysts’ 
forecasts in year t for firm i, FEit is the signed forecast error in year t for firm i scaled by actual earnings, and |FE|it is 
the absolute value of analysts’ earnings forecast errors in year t for firm i scaled by actual earnings, and INFOit is the 
information content of analysts forecasts. Note that actual earnings and analysts’ forecasts are measured in local 
currencies and the country subscript is omitted.  
 
FE measures the degree of analyst optimism; |FE| gauges the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts; and INFO 
assesses the relative performance of analysts’ forecasts against a naïve forecasting model – no change in earnings 
forecasts: Ait – Ai,t-1. The naïve model suggests that the contemporaneous earnings per share (Ait) are best predicted by 
the previous earnings per share (Ai,t-1). If the naïve model is true, INFO is equal to or greater than one. For instance, 
suppose that Ait turn out to be $0.2, while Ai,t-1 was $0.1. If the median analyst forecast were $0.25, then INFO would 
be (0.25 – 0.2) / (0.2 – 0.1) = 0.5, indicating that analysts’ forecast is more accurate than the naïve-model forecasting. 
 
Preliminary Analysis 
 
The overall descriptive statistics in Table 2 confirm the domestic evidence of analyst optimism and the 
superior performance of analysts forecasts over the naïve model. The grand mean of forecast errors is 0.0989 and 
significant at the 1% level. The grand mean of the information measure (INFO; 0.4944) is less than one, meaning that 
analysts’ forecasts outperform the naïve model. In addition, notice that there are about 12% of zero forecast errors, 
probably a suggestion of earnings management (Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser, 1999). The degree of earnings 
management seems to vary across countries with the percentage of zero forecast errors ranging from 2.94% (Japan) to 
24.69% (Germany). 
 
 
Table 2:  Overall Sample Statistics For FE And INFO 
 
This table presents overall descriptive statistics of contemporaneous forecast errors (FE) and  information content of earnings 
forecasts (INFO). POS% is the percentage of positive analysts' forecast errors; NEG% is the percentage of negative analysts' 
forecast errors. Zero% is the percentage of zero analysts’ forecast errors. I use the median estimate of individual earnings forecasts 
to obtain forecast errors. This mitigates the impact of extreme values.    
 N Mean Median POS% NEG% Zero% 
FE 50707 0.0989*** 0.0000 43.74% 44.32% 11.94% 
INFO 50707 0.4944 0.1639 N/A N/A N/A 
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Table 3 shows the results of the binomial tests on individual portfolios, both strong and weak. The test 
statistic of the binomial test is “T.” If “T” lies beyond the critical regions at each significance level, we reject the null 
hypothesis that the probability of a positive forecast error (=(+)FE) is 50%. For both the strong and the weak portfolio, 
we reject the null hypothesis at the 1% significance level. But, notice that (+)FE is smaller than (-)FE for the strong 
portfolio, while (+)FE is greater than (-)FE for the weak portfolio. This indicates that analyst optimism is more 
prevailing in the weak portfolio than in the strong portfolio. This is the first evidence that strong shareholder 
protection leads to lower analyst optimism.  
 
 
Table 3:  Nonparametric Binomial Test 
 
This table summarizes a nonparametric binomial test of the null hypothesis that the probability (p) of a positive forecast error [(+) 
FE] is 0.5 for all n trials – i.e., Ho: p=0.5. Note that “n” is the total number of positive and negative FEs excluding zero FEs.  
Following Conover (1980; pp. 96-99), we calculate the test statistic (T) and the corresponding critical regions at the 5% and 1% 
levels as follows: 
 
T = the number of (+) FEs; 
t1_5% (lower limit at the 5% level) = )1(96.1 pnpnp −− ; 
t2_5% (upper limit at the 5% level) = )1(96.1 pnpnp −+ ; 
t1_1% (lower limit at the 1% level) = )1(58.2 pnpnp −− ; 
t2_1% (upper limit at the 1% level) = )1(58.2 pnpnp −+ . 
 
 Na (+) FEa (−) FEa na T t1_1% t2_1% t1_5% t2_5% 
Strong 36512 16086 16982 33068 16086*** 16299 16769 16356 16712 
Weak 14247 6094 5489 11583 6094*** 5653 5930 5686 5897 
a N includes zero FEs, while n does not. (+) FE is the number of positive forecast errors; (−) FE is the number of negative forecast 
errors. 
 
 
Table 4 shows the mean values of forecast errors (FE), absolute forecast errors (|FE|), and INFO over the 
sample period 1989 – 2003. Analyst optimism is, on average, prevalent in all years. All mean FEs are positive and 
significant at the 1% level. The results also suggest that the performance of analysts’ forecasts dominates that of the 
naïve model. All mean INFOs are less than one and 73% of which are less than 0.5. Both parametric and non-
parametric correlation analysis presents a significant positive association between FE and |FE|. This is consistent with 
a common belief that there is a negative relationship between forecast accuracy and optimism (Butler and Lang, 1991; 
Ackert and Athanassakos, 1997). 
 
Results in Table 5 exhibit country-specific and portfolio-specific characteristics of analysts’ forecasts. The 
mean FEs vary across countries, ranging from 0.043 (Switzerland) to 0.284 (Mexico). A rather striking observation is 
the widespread analyst optimism across countries. All mean FEs are significantly positive at the 1% level. In addition, 
in 14 of 19 countries, the percentage frequency of positive forecast errors (POS%) is greater than 50%.  
 
The portfolio means of FE, |FE|, INFO, and POS% apparently contrast the strong portfolio with the weak. 
The mean FE of the strong portfolio is 0.0892, while the mean of the weak is 0.1239. Both parametric (Least-
Significant-Difference; LSD) and non-parametric (Scheffé's) mean comparison tests indicate that the mean FE 
difference between the strong and the weak portfolios is significant at the 1% level. The mean |FE| of the strong 
portfolio (0.2111) is significantly smaller than that of the weak portfolio (0.2414). In addition, the mean POS% of the 
strong portfolio (48.65%) is lower than the mean of the weak portfolio (52.61%). The country-mean and portfolio-
mean INFOs are all far smaller than one, suggesting that the superiority of analysts’ forecasts against the naïve model 
prevails across countries, legal systems, and portfolios. 
 
Journal of Applied Business Research – Second Quarter 2006                                                    Volume 22, Number 2 
 44 
Table 4:  Yearly Means For FE, |FE|, And INFO 
 
The table exhibits year-by-year means of FE, the absolute value of FE (|FE|), and INFO. All terms are as defined in Table 2. 
 N FE |FE| INFO 
1989 1025 0.0691*** 0.1479 0.5589 
1990 1889 0.0792*** 0.1621 0.4858 
1991 2268 0.0917*** 0.1735 0.4493 
1992 2687 0.0886*** 0.1831 0.4432 
1993 3102 0.0524*** 0.1534 0.3941 
1994 3159 0.0679*** 0.1797 0.4741 
1995 3402 0.0914*** 0.1867 0.4625 
1996 3765 0.0744*** 0.1938 0.4982 
1997 4233 0.0961*** 0.2270 0.5546 
1998 4447 0.1526*** 0.2724 0.4905 
1999 4427 0.1081*** 0.2668 0.5368 
2000 4182 0.1323*** 0.2787 0.5738 
2001 4221 0.1292*** 0.2494 0.4894 
2002 4203 0.1055*** 0.2428 0.4792 
2003 3697 0.0740*** 0.2029 0.4899 
 
 
Taken together, the strong portfolio is less optimistic and more accurate than the weak portfolio. As 
commonly observed in the U.S. studies, the evidence suggests that optimism is a dominant feature in international 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. It is also observed that analysts have more accurate earnings forecasts than does the naïve 
model. As Errunza and Miller (2000), Reese and Weisbach (2002), Baker et al. (2002), and Lang et al. (2003) suggest, 
I test whether the removal of cross-listed firms from the analysis changes these results. I regenerate the statistics (not 
shown) for preliminary analysis and find that the removal of cross-listed firms does not alter the major findings. 
 
Regression Analysis 
 
Two regression models, equations (4) and (5), are employed to explain the relationships between shareholder 
protection and analyst optimism and between shareholder protection and analyst forecast accuracy controlling for time, 
industry, the number of analysts’ forecasts, lagged forecast error (or lagged absolute forecast error), and standard 
deviation of earnings forecasts.  
 
The Spearman correlation coefficient between time (years) and FE is 0.52 and significant at the 5% level. 
The correlation coefficient between time and |FE| is 0.84, significant at the 1% level. Thus, controlling for time seems 
necessary. As in Lang et al. (2003), I also include industry dummies to control for possible industry effects. Ali and 
Hwang (2000) find that country-specific factors such as financial systems, the standard-setting process, tax rules, and 
external auditing services are significantly associated with the value relevance of financial accounting data. In this 
paper, the country effect is controlled by the portfolio dummy in the regression models. I add the number of analysts’ 
forecasts, the lagged forecast error, and the standard deviation of earnings forecasts as control variables to account for 
the impact of analyst coverage, bias persistence, and forecast dispersion respectively. The regression models I 
estimate are as follows:  
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where FEi,t is the contemporaneous forecast error for observation i in year t; |FE|i,t is the absolute value of the 
contemporaneous forecast error; PROTECTi,t is a binary variable equal to unity if an observation is classified in the 
strong shareholder-protected portfolio, and zero if classified as the weak portfolio; YEARi,t,s is a binary variable equal 
to unity if year t equals s, zero otherwise; INDi,t,I is a binary variable equal to unity if an observation belongs to 
industry I, zero otherwise; FEi,t-1 (|FE|i,t-1) is the forecast error (absolute value of the forecast error) one year prior to 
the contemporaneous forecast error; NUMESTi,t is the number of analysts’ forecasts for observation i in year t; and 
STDi,t is the standard deviation among individual analysts’ forecasts. The reference groups are the weak shareholder-
protected portfolio, 1989, and industry 1. Note that I use the I/B/E/S industry classification: industry 1 (finance) ~ 
industry 11 (public utilities).  
 
 
Table 5:  Country-By-Country Statistics Of FE, |FE|, And INFO 
 
This table exhibits the portfolio and country-by-country means of FE,  
the absolute value of FE (|FE|), INFO, and POS%. All terms are as defined in Table 2. 
Portfolio Countries FE |FE| INFO POS%a 
Strong 
Canada 0.1103*** 0.2623 0.5405 49.56 
Chile 0.1486*** 0.2260 0.6196 62.10 
Hong Kong 0.1662*** 0.2463 0.5919 59.39 
India 0.0680*** 0.1685 0.5865 51.67 
Japan 0.0808*** 0.2161 0.4344 50.21 
Malaysia 0.1107*** 0.2267 0.4686 46.69 
Singapore 0.1149*** 0.2234 0.4873 50.97 
South Africa 0.0736*** 0.1760 0.5412 51.38 
UK 0.0691*** 0.1735 0.5176 42.05 
Portfolio Mean 0.0892a 0.2100a 0.4933 48.65 
Weak 
Austria 0.1132*** 0.2111 0.4009 53.38 
Belgium 0.1116*** 0.2226 0.5448 55.43 
Denmark 0.0809*** 0.1945 0.4337 50.53 
Germany 0.1149*** 0.2247 0.4782 54.32 
Indonesia 0.2069*** 0.3135 0.5237 56.69 
Italy 0.1493*** 0.2968 0.6161 52.81 
Mexico 0.2841*** 0.4436 0.7982 56.24 
Netherlands 0.0692*** 0.1576 0.3971 48.45 
Switzerland 0.0429*** 0.1602 0.4779 47.58 
Turkey 0.1823*** 0.3120 0.4569 54.91 
Portfolio Mean 0.1239a 0.2414a 0.4972 52.61 
a Both parametric (LSD) and non-parametric (Scheffe’s) pair-wise comparison tests indicate that the mean differences between the 
strong and the weak portfolios are significant at the 1% level.  
* significant at the 10% level.  ** significant at the 5% level.  *** significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
The regression results support the findings reported in the previous section. The coefficient of PROTECT is 
significantly negative at the 1% level for both models. This indicates that strong shareholder protection reduces the 
optimistic tendency in analysts’ earnings forecasts and enhances their forecasting ability. The data also show that there 
are significant year and industry effects on FE and |FE|.  
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Table 6:  Mean Comparisons Between High And Low Portfolios Within Indicators 
 
The table (See next page.) contains parameter estimates and associated p-levels for two regression models estimated over the subset 
of observations in strong and weak shareholder-protected countries: 
 
where FEi,t is the contemporaneous forecast error for observation i in year t; |FE|i,t is the absolute value of the contemporaneous 
forecast error; PROTECTi,t is a binary variable equal to unity if an observation is classified in the strong shareholder-protected 
portfolio, and zero if classified as the weak portfolio; YEARi,t,s is a binary variable equal to unity if year t equals s, zero otherwise; 
INDi,t,I is a binary variable equal to unity if an observation belongs to industry I, zero otherwise; FEi,t-1 (|FE|i,t-1) is the forecast error 
(absolute value of the forecast error) one year prior to the contemporaneous forecast error; NUMESTi,t is the number of analysts’ 
forecasts for observation i in year t; and STDi,t is the standard deviation among individual analysts’ forecasts. The reference groups 
are the weak shareholder-protected portfolio, 1989, and industry 1. Note that I use the I/B/E/S industry classification: industry 1 
(finance) ~ industry 11 (public utilities). 
Variable Coefficient 
 Equation (4) Equation (5) 
Intercept 0.11405 *** 0.19317 *** 
PROTECT -0.03881 *** -0.04823 *** 
YEAR90 0.00723 0.01079 
YEAR91 0.02177 0.02906 
YEAR92 0.02134 0.04648 ** 
YEAR93 -0.01614 0.01845 
YEAR94 -0.00446 0.03368 * 
YEAR95 0.02128 0.04808 ** 
YEAR96 0.00485 0.04699 ** 
YEAR97 0.02642 0.08276 *** 
YEAR98 0.08134 *** 0.12823 *** 
YEAR99 0.02592 0.09669 *** 
YEAR00 0.07490 *** 0.13822 *** 
YEAR01 0.06951 *** 0.11358 *** 
YEAR02 0.06735 *** 0.14321 *** 
YEAR03 0.01947 0.09617 *** 
IND2 - Health Care -0.06037 *** -0.06943 *** 
IND3 - Consumer Non-Durables 0.00146 -0.01016 
IND4 - Consumer Services 0.01247 0.01151 
IND5 - Consumer Durables -0.02890 * -0.01395 
IND6 - Energy 0.04578 *** 0.08382 *** 
IND7 - Transportation -0.00253 0.02672 
IND8 -  Technology 0.00643 0.03512 *** 
IND9 - Basic Industries 0.00477 0.03064 *** 
IND10 - Capital Goods -0.02092 ** -0.01817 ** 
IND11 - Public Utilities -0.02912 * -0.02481 * 
FEi,t-1 (|FE|i,t-1) -0.000008 0.000002 
PROTECT* FEi,t-1 (|FE|i,t-1) 0.000753 * 0.000649 * 
NUMEST -0.00349 *** -0.00571 *** 
STD 0.000008 ** 0.000007 ** 
Adjusted R-square 0.0057  0.0137  
Number of Observations 50707   50707  
*** Significant at the 1% level.  ** Significant at the 5% level.  * Significant at the 10% level.  
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A positive correlation between FEi,t and FEi,t-1 is not observed for the weak portfolio. This result is not 
consistent with the evidence reported by Mendenhall (1991), Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), and Ali, Klein, and 
Rosenfeld (1992) for the domestic case. The coefficient of FEi,t-1 is statistically equal to zero. The same is true for the 
coefficient of |FE|i,t-1 . However, for the strong portfolio, the corresponding coefficients are significantly positive at 
the 1% level. The coefficient of FEi,t-1 for the strong portfolio is the sum of the coefficient of FEi,t-1 for the weak and 
the coefficient of the interaction term in equation (4). It is positive and significant at the 1% level. Similarly, the 
coefficient of |FE|i,t-1 for the strong portfolio is significantly positive at the 1% level. The positive coefficients of FEi,t-
1 and |FE|i,t-1 for the strong portfolio imply that analysts working in strong shareholder-protected countries tend to 
underreact to new earnings information, since the coefficients of FEi,t-1 and |FE|i,t-1 should not be significant if 
analysts fully incorporate the earnings information released a year prior to the contemporaneous year (Easterwood and 
Nutt , 1999). When analysts indeed underreacted to new earnings information at its inception, they would adjust for 
the underreaction over time and the adjustment would be manifested in the positive coefficient of FEi,t-1 and/or |FE|i,t-1.  
 
The coefficients of NUMEST for both models are -0.00349 and -0.00571. They are significant at the 1% level, 
suggesting that an increase in analyst coverage reduces analyst optimism and improves forecast accuracy. This finding 
is not surprising, since analyst coverage proxies private information acquisition (Barron and Stuerke, 1998). As the 
forecast dispersion (STD) increases, analyst optimism becomes more serious and forecast accuracy deteriorates. This 
positive association is significant at the 5% level. Similar results (not reported here) are observed when excluding 
cross-listed firms from the sample.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The paper relates analyst forecast bias to shareholder protection in a global setting. As commonly observed in 
U.S. analysts’ earnings forecasts, analyst optimism characterizes analysts’ earnings forecasts in many foreign 
countries. Country-specific mean forecast errors are all significantly positive at the 1% level. In addition, in 14 of 19 
countries, the percentage frequency of analyst optimism is greater than 50%.  Consistent with prior U.S. studies, the 
data also suggest that the superiority of analysts’ forecasts against the naïve model prevails across countries and 
portfolios. Both parametric and non-parametric correlation analyses present a significant positive association between 
FE and |FE|. This is consistent with a common belief that there is a negative relationship between forecast accuracy 
and optimism.  
 
Results reveal that analysts’ forecasts issued in countries with strong shareholder protection laws are less 
optimistic and more accurate than analysts’ forecasts published in countries with weak protection laws. In the strong 
shareholder-protected countries, analysts’ underreaction to earnings information is observed. Results also present 
significant effects of year, industry, bias persistence, analyst coverage, and forecast dispersion. The elimination of 
cross-listed firms does not change these conclusions. Another interesting observation is the high percentage of zero 
forecast errors across countries, suggesting widespread practice of earnings management. 
 
The current study provides evidence that analysts under different shareholder protection systems display 
distinctive characteristics of forecast bias. Thus, future research on the market reaction to such idiosyncratic forecast 
bias is warranted. It would be interesting to see how differently investors take new earnings news when they are 
subject to different shareholder protection systems.  
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